In sub-Saharan Africa, interest in strengthening property tax systems is often hindered by political and institutional barriers. Yet, centralized Francophone systems contrast with Anglophone decentralized property tax administration. Weak incentives for central governments to enhance tax collection and challenging intergovernmental collaboration can pose risks for reform. Using the case of Senegal, this paper examines the circumstances prompting political support for reform and the impact of interinstitutional and interinstitutional collaboration barriers. The case of Senegal is distinctive as the central has initiated property tax reforms led by the Directorate General of Taxes and Estates (DGID), despite the fact that the benefits accrue to local governments. Drawing on data from interviews and documents, the analysis sheds light on the role and intricate relationship between political motivations for reform and collaboration dynamics and their impact on the effectiveness of property tax mobilization, especially in centralized systems where municipalities traditionally have lesser roles.
- Country
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Senegal
